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discrimination in favor of the public and in accord with public
policy as well as the expressed policy of the commission's General
Order Number 2 exempting agencies of the public from its
12
restrictions.
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Charles A. Reynard*
Five of the decisions at the past term are of significance to
students of state and local taxation. Two of these presented
questions relating to ad valorem taxation and the remaining
three involved corporate franchise taxation, intergovernmental
tax immunity and summary confiscation of property used in
violation of state revenue measures.
State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co. v. Ott' presented
the question whether deferred premium payments on automobile
insurance policies are "credits" within the reach of state and city
ad valorem taxation. It was shown to be the practice of the
insurance company to issue its automobile insurance policies for
periods of six months upon the payment of one-third of the
premium with the stipulation that the balance was to be paid
at the expiration of sixty days. The insurer contended that since
it reserved the right to cancel its policies at the end of the sixtyday period upon the non-payment of the balance of the premium,
the deferred payments were not in fact "credits"; or, put in
another way, it was the company's contention that it was not
extending credit under this method of doing business. The court
rejected the claim of the insurance company in a unanimous
opinion by Justice Hawthorne because "By the very terms of the
policy issued, the insurance company obligates itself to insure
for a term of six months ....-2 The right of cancellation for
non-payment of deferred premiums was regarded as immaterial
since the policy did not relieve the insured from the obligation
to pay the full amount of the premium, and thereby invested the
insurer with the right, if it chose, to compel the payment of the
deferred portion of the premium.
In Albritton v. Childers' the central issue of the case con12. Ibid.

I Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 224 La. 1008, 71 So.2d 548 (1954).
2. 224 La. 1008, 1012, 71 So.2d 548, 550 (1954).
3. 74 So.2d 156 (La. 1954).
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cerned the validity of a tax sale of a tract of land consisting of
39 acres, 28 of which lie in East Feliciana Parish, the other 11 in
East Baton Rouge Parish, by the sheriff of East Baton Rouge
Parish for unpaid taxes allegedly due to his parish on the whole
tract. Applicable provisions of the Revised Statutes relating to
assessment procedure make it clear that "When a line between
two parishes divides a tract of land,

. .

. each portion shall be

assessed in the parish in which it lies . . . .- 4 Counsel for the
losing party were not unaware of this statutory provision, but
contended that under the circumstances the court should invoke
the maxim "common error becomes the law." The court found
the maxim inapplicable in this case, however, in the light of the
fact that there had never been any misunderstanding between
the several parties to the controversy concerning the exact location of the parish boundary. In this manner several earlier cases
which applied the maxim in parish boundary situations were
satisfactorily distinguished and the result seems proper.
A novel and significant issue of apportionment under the
corporation franchise tax was presented in Arkansas Fuel Oil
Corp. v. Fontenot5 and the decision may give cause for concern
to business firms operating on a parent-subsidiary corporate
basis in Louisiana. The case was a suit for the refund of taxes
paid under protest. The plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, had
its principal office in Louisiana, but functioned here simply as a
holding company, possessing few assets within the state. Two
of its wholly owned subsidiaries (chartered in Delaware and
West Virginia) did business here as well as in other states. Each
of the three corporations had apparently paid corporation franchise taxes upon the basis of the allocation formula set forth
in Subsection A of R.S. 47:606 which provides for an apportionment of capital based upon the arithmetic average of two ratios
based upon property and sales. The Collector of Revenue, proceeding under the provisions of Subsection B had assessed substantial additional taxes against the parent corporation. This
latter subsection, bearing the title "Allocation of intercompany
items," reads in part as follows: "For the purpose of allocation,
investments in, advances to, or revenues from a parent or subsidiary corporation shall be allocated to Louisiana on the basis
of the percentage of capital employed in Louisiana for corpora4. LA. R.S. 47:1952 (1950).
5. 225 La. 166, 72 So.2d 465 (1954).
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tion franchise tax purposes by the parent or subsidiary corporation."
The court stated the collector's contention in the following
language: "This, the Collector contends, means that if the subsidiary, under the general allocation formula, has 50% of its
'taxable capital' allocated to Louisiana as capital employed in
Louisiana, then 50% of all investments in or advances to a subsidiary corporation by the parent corporation are allocated to
Louisiana as 'taxable capital' of the parent corporation, and 50%
of all revenues received from a subsidiary corporation by the
parent corporation are allocated to Louisiana as 'taxable capital'
of the parent corporation." The court was unanimous in its
acceptance of the collector's construction of the statute, rejecting
the taxpayer's theory that Subsection B merely imposed a limitation on the proportion of capital to be allocated to Louisiana
under the terms of Subsection A. The decision on this point
seems entirely correct as there is nothing to be found in the
legislative language to support the contention of the plaintiff.
The further argument of the taxpayer that the parent's
investments in and receipt of income from the subsidiary should
be regarded as occurring outside the state (either at the domicile
of the corporation in Delaware or elsewhere) was rejected with
the well settled observation that the doctrine of "mobilia
sequuntur personam" has no application to taxation of intangibles, citing the leading case of Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox.7
Similarly, and for substantially the same reason, the court
rejected various constitutional objections advanced by the taxpayer. The mere fact that a reasonable allocation formula results
in double taxation of similar items of intangible property is no
longer considered constitutionally objectionable. Curry v. McCanless8 settled that issue more than fifteen years ago.
Viewed objectively the result of the case, and the legislation
which it sustains, seems reasonable. While there may be some
objection to the prospect of double taxation as an abstract proposition, it does not seem to justify criticism in the context of this
case. A corporation which determines to operate through the
agency of subsidiaries must be presumed to have sound and
economically desirable ends in view. For the right it confers
upon the corporation to exploit these advantages a state must be
6. 72 So.2d 465, 471 (La. 1954).
7. 298 U.S. 193 (1936).
8. 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
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accorded the right to exact tax revenue in return. The corporation may appraise the operational and economic advantages
against the burden of increased taxation. The decision takes
these factors into account and reaches a desirable conclusion.
The taxpayer's appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
was dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question on
October 14, 1954.
Murphy Corporation v. Fontenot9 presented the court with
a troublesome issue of intergovernmental tax immunity. In this
case Louisiana had exacted severance taxes from several private
oil and gas producers in connection with their operations under
federal leases on Barksdale Air Force Base, and the taxpayers
were suing for refunds, contending that the state was without
legislative authority over activities occurring on the federal
property.
If the land held by the federal government had been nonmilitary in character there would have been little question of
the right of the state to enforce its revenue measure in the light
of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Helvering
v. Mountain Producers Corporation.' That case overruled a
prior line of jurisprudence which had regarded taxation of the
income of persons derived from contracts with the government
for the exploitation of governmentally owned land as being
tantamount to a tax on the source of the income itself." Since
that date there has been a constant narrowing of the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity to the point that state taxation
has been sustained even where it could be clearly shown that
the economic burden of the tax was sustained by the federal
government. 1 2 Since the doctrine had no express foundation in
the Constitution and was founded upon implications of federalism
there is little reason to wonder about its tortured history. The
real wonder is that it ever achieved a foothold in the jurisprudence of constitutional law in the first place.
It was the military character of the federal reservation which
presented difficulty in the Murphy Corporation case because of
the language of Article I, Section 8, of the Federal Constitution
9. 225 La. 379, 73 So.2d 180 (1954).
10. 303 U.S. 376 (1938).
11. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932); Gillespie v.
Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922).
12. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941). See also James v.
Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); cf. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 74 Sup. Ct. 403 (1954), 14 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 696.
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which confers exclusive legislative authority upon Congress
(cover all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of
the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts,
magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings."
But even this express provision of the Constitution has been held
to be no bar to state taxation when the activity taxed in no way
derogates the independence and sovereignty of the United States.
This construction was first adopted in 1885 when Kansas was
permitted to tax the franchise of a railroad operating on the
federal military reservation at Ft. Leavenworth 5 and that
decision gave sound reason for the court's reaching the same
conclusion here.
14
The case of Cooper v. One White Model 1950 Motor Tractor
was a forfeiture proceeding growing out of violations of the
tobacco tax 15 and unquestionably occasioned much difficulty for
the court. In its original decision the court unanimously agreed
that there might be forfeiture of a truck used to transport unstamped cigarettes into the state for sale in violation of the tax
despite the owner's ignorance of the driver's illegal activity. On
rehearing, however, the court reversed its earlier decision by a
vote of five to two. The entire controversy centered about an
issue of statutory construction. All members of the court at both
hearings were in agreement that the legislature has the constitutional power to compel forfeiture in such circumstances, 16 the
narrow question here was whether it had in fact exercised such
power.

The tobacco tax is set forth in Sections 841 to 869 of Title 47
of the Revised Statutes. Section 863 clearly authorizes the collector to proceed with forfeiture "of any automobile, truck, boat,
conveyance, vehicle .. .used in the transportation of any article
• ..on which the tax has not been paid . . . ." And this section
does not, by its terms, make the owner's knowledge of the facts
a condition precedent to the forfeiture proceeding. Section 865
authorizes the collector to seize and proceed with forfeiture of
"All cigars, cigarettes . . . found in possession . ..of any person
... with the design to avoid payment of the taxes ... ." Section
866 then provides the controversial language, saying, "Any person who claims title to the seized property . . . and who did not
13.
14.
15.
16.

Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
225 La. 190, 72 So.2d 474 (1953).
LA. R.S. 47:841-869 (1950).
Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
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* in any respect participate in the violation of this Chapter, may
. . . [have] the said property . . . released by the collector and
"
delivered to him ..
The majority on rehearing construed this language just
quoted to refer to and embrace the types of vehicles mentioned
in Section 863 which are used to transport untaxed goods, as well
as the goods themselves, mentioned in Section 865. Justice Hawthorne in his dissenting opinion expressed the view that the
provisions of Section 866 applied only to the contraband goods
themselves, seizure of which is authorized by the next preceding
section, and did not refer back to Section 863. Justice Moise did
not express himself on the point, though voting to sustain the
forfeiture.
The question is not free from doubt and while neither the
majority nor the dissent make a completely persuasive case, it
is suggested that the result may be sustained on the general
theory that penal and forfeiture provisions are to be strictly
construed.

Commercial Law
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
It seems clear that our ideas about insurance and its importance as an instrumentality of considerable social consequence for protecting the individual against personal loss have
expanded a great deal over the past thirty years. That many
years ago when an automobile tipped over and its side struck
the road violently, the accident was held not to constitute a
"collision." In January of this year when the right rear dual
wheels of a dump truck came off while being driven and the
rear portion of the body struck the roadway violently, the accident was held to constitute a "collision." Justices LeBlanc and
Hamiter disagreed. Perhaps insurers may not try to do anything
about it, but if they feel so inclined, they can pursue the willo'-the-wisp beckoning in the suggestion, "if [the insurer] had
desired to circumscribe its liability to certain specified types of
collisions, it could have spelled out such restrictive coverage
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

